Everest Group

Everest sits on both sides of delegated underwriting: its reinsurance franchise can support the carrier behind a program, while its insurance businesses can provide direct program paper, designated underwriting authority and fronting services. The distinction matters because each route creates a different chain of risk, control and economics. In the United States, Everest says program administrators may market, underwrite, rate and issue policies on its behalf, and some may also perform loss control and claims functions. In Canada it explicitly offers affinity, MGA delegated-authority and fronted structures. At Lloyd’s, its property team publishes an absolute maximum delegated-authority line of US$15 million per coverholder, distinct from an open-market maximum of US$25 million per assured. The delegated portfolio targets non-industrial occupancies in Lloyd’s-licensed territories, with the U.K., Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Hong Kong named as examples. MGA Index assessment: these are different distribution limits, not interchangeable measures of capacity. A coverholder should confirm the agreed binder limit, occupancy scope, territory and accumulation controls rather than assume the advertised maximum is available to its program. These are meaningful capabilities, but scale should not obscure selectivity. Everest says it looks for administrators with demonstrated profitability, market expertise, distribution, entrepreneurial capability and strong financials, and requires enough premium to absorb both losses and expenses. That last condition is central: a program can have attractive loss experience and still fail a carrier’s return threshold once acquisition, claims, reinsurance, technology and oversight costs are included. Everest’s strategic reshaping sharpens that test. The group agreed to transfer roughly $2 billion of retail commercial renewal rights to AIG while retaining Global Wholesale and Specialty, Underwriting Programs and other focused businesses. In the second quarter of 2026, its core businesses produced $3.7 billion of gross written premium and a 90.0% combined ratio, but the Global Wholesale and Specialty segment’s combined ratio was 95.2%, compared with 88.5% for Reinsurance Treaty. An MGA evaluating Everest should therefore examine the precise entity, segment, retention and service model behind its capacity rather than relying on groupwide results. The group’s A+ financial-strength ratings and $15.5 billion of year-end 2025 equity support counterparty confidence; they do not replace agreement on authority, claims control, data cadence, expense load and remediation triggers. The most durable program will be the one that can explain its economics after all frictional costs and show how those economics remain acceptable as rates, loss trends and reinsurance terms change.